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Implicit Bias Reflects the Personal and the Social
Andrew M. Riversa, Heather R. Reesa, Jimmy Calanchinib, and Jeffrey W. Shermana
aDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California; bInstitut f€ur Psychologie, Albert-Ludwigs-Universit€at Freiburg, Freiburg im
Breisgau, Germany
This issue’s target article by Payne, Vuletich, and Lundberg
(PV&L) does exactly what one should, presenting an argument
that is thought-provoking and that challenges current ortho-
doxy. It also addresses an issue that has increasingly con-
founded attitudes researchers in recent years.
The construct of “implicit bias” was initially conceptualized
as a latent construct that exists within persons, relatively resis-
tant to situational influences. A plethora of theoretical models
converge on the notion that implicit biases, including inter-
group biases, are representations that are stored in memory
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Wil-
son, Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000). Although some perspectives
emphasize the role of culture in contributing to implicit meas-
ures of bias, even these perspectives rely on the learning and
storage of mental representations (Olson & Fazio, 2004).
Researchers have sought to bridge the divide separating
biases of individual perceivers from the larger culture within
which they are embedded (e.g., Dunham, Chen, & Banaji,
2013). This has been no easy task, which may have been sty-
mied by the early conceptualization of implicit bias as a stable
individual difference, rather than as a construct prone to situa-
tional malleability. PV&L (this issue) offer Bias of Crowds
(BoC), an intriguing perspective on implicit bias that provoca-
tively pushes situational variability as central and primary,
rather than secondary. We applaud this new perspective; after
all, we are social psychologists with a long tradition of studying
how situations influence human cognition and behavior.
Although the BoC emphasis on situational influence offers a
much-needed shift toward the social component of implicit
bias, we believe that the strong claim that implicit measures
reflect only social context goes too far, and is not supported by
the data.
Individual versus Aggregate Level Implicit Bias
and Behavior
We share PV&L’s enthusiasm for the aggregate level (e.g.,
nation, state, metropolitan area) approach to examining the
relationship between implicit bias and behavioral outcomes.
Indeed, some of us are actively involved in such investigations
(e.g., Calanchini, Hehman, & Salerno, 2017; Calanchini, Wit-
kowski, Sparks, Schmidt, & Sherman, 2017; Hehman, Calan-
chini, Flake & Leitner, 2017; Hehman, Flake, & Calanchini, in
press). However, our willingness to draw strong conclusions
about the superiority of implicit bias operationalized at the
aggregate versus individual level in predicting behavior is tem-
pered by the relatively small number of studies to date that
have employed the aggregate approach. To our knowledge,
PV&L’s summary of published research on aggregate implicit
bias is exhaustive, with the exception of one article by Leitner,
Hehman, Ayduk, and Mendoza-Denton (2016a), who found
that county level implicit racial bias predicted regional racial
mortality disparities, but only when implicit and explicit biases
were modeled separately. Whereas only a handful of scientific
publications have so far examined the relationship between
aggregate implicit bias and behavior, hundreds of studies have
examined the relationship between individual implicit bias and
behavior, which have been summarized in multiple meta-analy-
ses (e.g., Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; Green-
wald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Oswald, Mitchell,
Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). Consequently, we have a
very good idea of how strongly individual implicit bias corre-
sponds to behavior, with estimates ranging from r D .14
(Oswald et al., 2013) to .28 (Cameron et al., 2012). However,
given that the upper limit on which two measures can correlate
is determined by the reliability of each measure, we cannot
unambiguously interpret these low correlations between indi-
vidual implicit bias and behavior as evidence of either low atti-
tude/behavior correspondence or poor measurement reliability.
Region level analyses have thus far produced relatively large
effects and tend to be very well powered (e.g., Hehman et al.,
2017; Leitner et al., 2016a, 2016b; Nosek et al., 2009; Zerhouni,
Rougier, & Muller, 2016). Because aggregation increases reli-
ability, these initial region level findings suggest that individual
level attitude/behavior correlations may be suppressed by low
measurement reliability. Nevertheless, more evidence is needed
before we can draw strong conclusions about the superiority of
aggregate- versus individual level predictions of biased
behavior.
BoC versus Models of Chronic and Temporary
Accessibility
We believe that BoC could be more effectively integrated with
existing models of chronic and temporary accessibility. As
PV&L acknowledge, there is a long history of research examin-
ing conditions under which implicit intergroup biases are
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situationally malleable (e.g., Blair, 2002). In addition, many
existing models of accessibility allow for the influence of both
stable stored target-attitude relations and temporarily accessible
or activated relations. More broadly, social psychologists have
studied the interactions between chronically and temporarily
accessible information for a long time. For example, Higgins
(1996) proposed that social contexts increase the temporary
accessibility of context-relevant information, whereas chronic
accessibility is rooted in the individual’s learning history,
including cultural contexts, personally endorsed lay theories,
and the frequency of exposure to the concept. Similarly, Fazio
(2007) asserted that attitudes can be thought of as object-evalu-
ation associations that are somewhat stable and differ in
strength based on prior learning history but that the extent to
which these attitudes are expressed in behavior depends both
on the strength of the stable association and on what features
are made contextually salient. Conrey and Smith’s (2007) dis-
tributed connectionist model of attitudes expresses temporary
and chronic forms of accessibility in a plausible self-contained
system and illustrates how repeated accessibility can eventually
lead to change in overlearned, chronically accessible attitudes.
Each of these models acknowledges that situations can tempo-
rarily influence the accessibility of specific concepts but also
balances this against the individual’s learning history. Indeed,
few researchers would disagree with the critical assumption of
PV&L’s proposal: Situations meaningfully influence implicit
biases at the individual level. When considered in comparison
to existing attitude models, it is clear that the novelty of BoC is
not so much in its claims of situational dependence but,
instead, in the weight it assigns to situations relative to individ-
ual learning histories.
Just as BoC largely fits into the existing constellation of atti-
tude models, so too can many of the puzzles highlighted by
PV&L be understood through the lens of standard accessibility
models. For example, PV&L note that the question of whether
implicit bias is personal or extrapersonal is rendered moot
when implicit biases are exclusively the product of temporary
accessibility. However, models that permit the influence of
both chronically and temporarily accessible information find
the whole binary nature of the proposal simplistic, and not in
need of resolution in the first place. First, at any given time,
bias will necessarily reflect a combination of what is chronic
and what is temporary. Second, there is no reason to doubt that
individual implicit biases reflect, among other things, the extent
to which culture has codified inequality into the societal fabric
(e.g., laws and stable cultural norms). The either/or demand
that implicit bias reflect either the personal or the social is
strange. No one questions whether Americans’ general aversion
to horse meat is truly an individual attitude versus a cultural
construct. Culture affects the development of persistent associa-
tions as well as what concepts are temporarily accessible. This
fact does not change the conclusion that biases are, in part, rep-
resentations residing within individuals.
Likewise, explaining the (un)consciousness of implicit biases
does not require the extreme contextualist proposal of BoC.
The fact that people can accurately predict their implicit biases
requires only that they can recognize what concepts are cur-
rently accessible or, alternatively, recognize the spontaneous
biases that have been activated. Accessibility could arise from
either temporary sources such as recently activated concepts or
chronic attitudes that are rooted in learning history (or more
likely a mixture of both). The research discussed by PV&L
(Hahn et al., 2014; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008) is unable
to distinguish between these two sources. Similarly, that people
report different biases when asked for considered opinions or
instant reactions does not speak to whether implicit biases are
determined by temporary or chronic representations. Instead,
the existing research indicates only that people recognize that
their spontaneous reactions may differ from what they person-
ally endorse and/or what they report on explicit measures.
A situational approach to interventions that target implicit
biases is well worth considering but again is not incompatible
with existing accessibility models. PV&L suggest that the situa-
tionist approach to implicit bias interventions needs more
research. We wholeheartedly agree with this recommendation
and also agree that, thus far, interventions focusing on chang-
ing individual level implicit intergroup biases have been inef-
fective (e.g., Lai et al., 2016). A revised accessibility model that
assigns substantial weight to temporary influences (and little to
chronic factors) would converge with BoC in targeting situa-
tions, more so than individuals, for intervention. To the extent
that temporary (versus chronic) factors dictate concept accessi-
bility, interventions that target the causes of temporary accessi-
bility will be most fruitful. As PV&L note, there appear to be
attitudinal domains (e.g., political attitudes) in which chronic
accessibility may play a larger role compared with intergroup
attitudes. These cases can also be understood through the lens
of a traditional accessibility model that assigns a greater degree
of weight to chronic influences and do not necessitate a model
giving all the weight to current context. In general, we see no
advantage to developing different attitude models to account
for attitudes in different domains.
Where Did the Bias Come From?
One challenge for BoC is accounting for the initial formation of
bias. BoC can explain how implicit intergroup biases are per-
petuated once established, but seems to have challenges
explaining the ultimate causes for intergroup biases. In other
words, how do evaluative biases emerge in the first place? It is
clear that biased crowds may codify their intergroup preferen-
ces into regulations, norms, or formal lawmaking. This would
serve as a stable situational cue to influence subsequent per-
ceivers. But at some point in the development of intergroup
preferences, an individual or group must have learned inter-
group bias without having been taught. Further, the individual’s
preference must have been durable enough to persist over time
and communicable enough to spread widely within that indi-
vidual’s social circle.
There are many accounts for the development of intergroup
preferences, including evolutionary accounts, learning and
attentional processes, and intergroup competition, among
others. Most, if not all, of these accounts would agree with the
idea that social learning serves as a mechanism to propagate
biases across cultures but would disagree with the idea that
individuals do not store stable intergroup attitudes. PV&L
imply that implicit biases flow primarily from stable systems, in


























the biased system. But, at some point, individuals must have
successfully influenced the system to formally instantiate its
biases. If not, another mechanism is necessary to explain what
led to the initial formalization of intergroup biases. Models that
allow for some attitude stability within individuals are better
equipped to explain the early formalization of systematic biases.
Accessibility and Control at Individual and Aggregate
Levels of Analysis
Although situations surely influence the accessibility of differ-
ent concepts and associations, they also influence measured
implicit bias via different processes. Our own research, as well
as that of PV&L’s research group and others, has demonstrated
that implicit measures reflect more than accessible associations
(e.g., associations between Black–unpleasant, White–pleasant).
Instead, responses on implicit measures reflect multiple inter-
acting and qualitatively distinct cognitive processes (e.g., Con-
rey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005;
Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012; Payne, 2001; Payne, Hall,
Cameron, & Bishara, 2010). Some of these processes are related
to the content of currently accessible associations (e.g., Black–
unpleasant association activation), whereas other processes
constrain or inhibit the influence of currently accessible mental
contents. Both types of processes are affected by current
context.
The extent to which implicit bias reflects the contribution of
accessible associations versus control-oriented processes sug-
gests a novel implication of the BoC perspective: Would BoC
predict that the influence of control processes depends on situ-
ational factors? Calanchini, Sherman, Klauer, and Lai (2014)
demonstrated that some of the control processes that contrib-
ute to responses on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) operate
similarly across attitude objects, which suggests that control
may be relatively invariant across situations. That said, the con-
trol processes that influence responses on implicit measures are
clearly not situationally independent. For example, the influ-
ence of control is diminished when executive resources are
scarce, such as when judgments are made under time pressure
(e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Payne, 2001). Future research should
investigate the extent to which accessibility and control pro-
cesses are influenced by other situational factors. In addition,
future work could clarify how accessibility and control contrib-
ute to the discrepancy between individual level and aggregate
level stability of implicit intergroup biases.
On Reliability
Because the low temporal stability of implicit bias measures is a
focal point of the BoC proposal (see PV&L’s Puzzle 1), it is rele-
vant to consider methodological and/or psychological factors
related to measurement instability. PV&L note that test–retest
reliability for measures of intergroup bias, such as the IAT and
AMP, fluctuate around r D .4 (Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, &
Galdi, 2017). These reliabilities are low in comparison to
explicit measures of bias. However, it may be more apt to com-
pare the test–retest reliability of implicit measures of bias
against measures that are procedurally similar, rather than
against procedurally dissimilar explicit measures of bias
(e.g., self-report, feeling thermometers). Examining the reliabil-
ity of cognitive processing measures, W€ostmann et al. (2013)
found the test–retest reliability of the Stroop color-word task to
be r D .70 and the reliability of the Eriksen Flanker task to be
r D .53. Measures that rely on rapid sequential priming, such as
semantic priming tasks, have shown even lower test–retest reli-
ability. For example Stolz, Besner, and Carr (2005) found
strong semantic priming effects at the group level but test–
retest reliability of only r D .4, even within a single session.
Test–retest reliability decreased as measurement conditions
became more “automatic” (i.e., shorter vs. longer stimulus-
onset asynchrony, smaller vs. larger semantic relatedness pro-
portion). Evidence from this line of work led Stolz and col-
leagues to conclude that the contents of semantic memory “are
inherently noisy and uncoordinated in their automatic or
reflexive activities” (p. 328). To emphasize the similarity of this
work, 81% of participants showed semantic priming effects
under the most constrained measurement conditions, paralle-
ling the 85% of participants who generally show intergroup
biases on implicit measures. Yet, simultaneously, test—retest
reliability of the semantic priming effect was r D –.06. Extrapo-
lating from this, it appears that group level effects can be quite
replicable even in the presence of large intraindividual variabil-
ity, as long as there exists small but reliable biases among most
respondents.
Very recent work by Hedge, Powell, and Sumner (2017)
describes a paradox similar to that illustrated by PV&L (see
Puzzle 1). According to the Reliability Paradox, measures of
cognitive processing (e.g., Stroop, Flanker, go/no-go) produce
replicable group level estimates but are ineffective tools at cap-
turing differences between participants. Hedge and colleagues
found that common measures of cognitive processing could
not reliably rank participants’ performance. In light of this find-
ing, Hedge and colleagues considered the possibility that indi-
viduals’ cognitive processing is context specific and highly
variable over time—a proposal that maps closely onto that of
PV&L’s BoC perspective—but reject it in favor of the argument
that measures of cognitive processing are inherently limited in
their ability to characterize individual differences in processing.
In other words, Hedge et al. (2017) maintained that cognitive
processing is an individual level construct but conceded that
cognitive processing measures appear to produce limited inter-
individual variance. The lack of reliability in implicit measures
of bias may not reflect the absence of individual level attitudes
but instead may reflect the fact that measurement conditions
characterizing implicit measures attenuate individual differen-
ces in bias. This possibility has serious implications for our
interpretations of implicit measures and highlights the neces-
sity of future work to determine the extent to which currently
used implicit measures are capable of reliably estimating indi-
vidual differences in bias.
Summary
PV&L present the BoC model to reconcile the apparent contra-
diction of stable implicit intergroup biases at the group level
and unstable implicit intergroup biases at the individual level.


























situational influences on implicit bias. However, we have sev-
eral reservations with the BoC perspective.
First, it is unclear whether BoC is generative above and
beyond traditional attitude models that posit that both tempo-
rary and chronic accessibility influence the measurement of
mental concepts. BoC is unique in its suggestion that implicit
measures reflect solely the concepts made temporarily accessi-
ble by the perceiver’s current situation and not at all by the
influence of stable, mental representations developed over the
perceiver’s learning history. Standard models of chronic and
temporary accessibility can reproduce such outcomes by simply
altering the relative weights given to each, without entirely dis-
pensing with the notion of (semi-) stable representations.
Second, BoC illustrates one possible means by which formal-
ized intergroup discrimination may be propagated, even while
individuals do not endorse discrimination. However, though
BoC generates new predictions for the stability of group level
intergroup biases, it does not offer an account of how bias got
into the system in the first place. The relationship between the
personal and the social would seem to be bidirectional, rather
than flowing only from the social to the personal.
Third, though BoC emphasizes the role of concept accessi-
bility, context may also influence expressed implicit bias via
other mechanisms, including some related to cognitive control.
The extent to which each affects contextualized implicit atti-
tudes is an important question for future research.
Finally, care is required when interpreting the reliability of
implicit evaluative measures. Reliability is indeed less than ideal
from a statistical perspective, and perhaps lower than expected
given prominent descriptions of implicit attitudes as stable and
resistant to situational influence. Even so, we should consider
what benchmarks are appropriate when evaluating the reliabil-
ity of implicit measures. Measures of cognitive processing also
demonstrate surprisingly low test–retest reliability and yet cog-
nitive processing is not questioned as a construct residing
within-persons. Similarly, we think it is premature to wholly
reject implicit intergroup bias as a construct residing within
individuals.
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